《香港自治法》（Hong Kong Autonomy Act）

[May35]

2022 Hong Kong Policy Act Report
https://www.state.gov/2022-hong-kong-policy-act-report/

Consistent with Sections 205 and 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (the “Act”) (22 U.S.C. §§ 5725 and 5731) and section 7043(f)(3)© of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (Div. K, P.L. 117-103), the Department submits this report and the enclosed certification on conditions in Hong Kong from March 2021 through March 2022 (“covered period”).

Summary
The Department of State assesses that during the covered period, the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took new actions directly threatening U.S. interests in Hong Kong and that are inconsistent with the Basic Law and the PRC’s obligation pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 (Sino-British Joint Declaration) to allow Hong Kong to enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In the Certification of Hong Kong’s Treatment under United States Laws, the Secretary of State certified Hong Kong does not warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997.

During the covered period, PRC authorities took actions that eliminated the ability of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy opposition to play a meaningful role in the city’s governance and effectively criminalized peaceful political expression critical of the central and local governments. The PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed a decision imposing sweeping changes to Hong Kong’s electoral system that blocked the participation of political groups not approved by Beijing and greatly diminished Hong Kong voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice.

PRC and Hong Kong authorities targeted groups, associations, media companies, and labor unions affiliated with the region’s pro‑democracy movement with raids, arrests, prosecutions, and asset freezes, creating a chilling effect and forcing them and other organizations to cease operations, including two of Hong Kong’s largest independent media outlets, Apple Daily and Stand News. With Beijing’s support, Hong Kong authorities continued to use the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (NSL) to undermine rights and freedoms, including freedoms protected under the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Hong Kong police and prosecutors employed the NSL to detain individuals for lengthy periods without trial for nonviolent political expression or activities, including 47 activists and politicians charged with “subversion” for involvement in an unofficial primary election in July 2020. Those charged under the NSL were denied bail unless the judge had sufficient grounds for believing the accused would “not continue to commit acts endangering national security,” an extremely broad and vague standard under the NSL. Hong Kong authorities restricted activities and cultural works commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and arrested, charged, or convicted at least 33 individuals in connection with those activities.

Impact on Democratic Institutions and Universal Suffrage
During the covered period, PRC and Hong Kong authorities deliberately acted to restrict the ability of Hong Kong voters to elect representatives of their choosing, and PRC officials played an unprecedented role in directing the outcome of the Hong Kong elections. In March 2021, the NPCSC, the highest body within the PRC legislature, issued a decision that overhauled Hong Kong’s electoral system to ensure Beijing could fully control the outcome of any future election. The decision required that all candidates for public office be pro-Beijing “patriots” and required them to undergo an extended nomination and vetting process, without possibility of appeal. It overhauled the composition of the Chief Executive Election Committee (CEEC) that selects Hong Kong’s chief executive, reducing the number of voters for CEEC seats by 97 percent, and created a system in which more than 1,100 of the 1,500 seats in the new CEEC were uncontested in the September 2021 CEEC election. The decision also changed the makeup of the Legislative Council (LegCo), Hong Kong’s legislature. Under the new system, Hong Kong voters directly elect only 20 of LegCo’s 90 members, compared to 40 out of 70 previously. The CEEC directly selects 40 LegCo members, while the remaining 30 are selected as representatives of “functional constituencies” for various economic and professional sectors. These changes ran directly counter to provisions in the Basic Law that describe the election of the Chief Executive and LegCo via universal suffrage as the “ultimate aim.”

In CEEC and LegCo elections in September and December 2021, respectively, pro-Beijing candidates won all but one seat in each body. No major opposition party fielded candidates in the December 2021 LegCo election, frequently citing that many of their leaders and members were detained or imprisoned on politically motivated charges. Turnout for the election was only 30.2 percent (29.6 percent, excluding blank and invalid ballots), an historic low for a LegCo election.

In May 2021, Hong Kong authorities passed new legislation, in accordance with the NSL, that required all elected members of local district councils to swear loyalty oaths to Beijing. The district councils are Hong Kong’s only representative bodies elected solely through universal suffrage, and the opposition pan‑democratic camp won 388 out of 479 seats in the 2019 district council elections. After the legislation passed, Hong Kong officials told local media that council members who took the oath and were subsequently disqualified for giving “insincere” oaths might be required to reimburse the Hong Kong government for up to hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars in salaries and expenses. More than 260 district council members resigned rather than take the oath. Hong Kong authorities subsequently administered the loyalty oaths to the remaining district council members in September and October 2021, then disqualified 49 pan‑democratic district council members without possibility of appeal. Local observers assessed the imposition of loyalty oaths, the effort to pressure district council members to resign, and the disqualification of dozens of elected officials constituted a move by Hong Kong authorities to overturn the results of the 2019 election and break the pan-democratic camp’s hold over the district councils.

In August 2021, the Hong Kong Chief Secretary announced that Cheng Chung-tai, one of two LegCo members at the time who did not caucus with the pro-Beijing camp, had failed to pass the vetting process to run for a seat on the CEEC. As a result, Cheng was also disqualified from his LegCo seat with immediate effect.

Media reports indicated that officials from the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government, the PRC’s primary representative office in Hong Kong, actively recruited candidates for the December 2021 LegCo election. On several occasions before the LegCo election, officials from the PRC State Council Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office delivered remarks giving criteria for the type of “patriots” who would be permitted to run in Hong Kong elections.

[May35]

Impact on Police and Security Functions
Hong Kong authorities used the NSL, which the NPCSC imposed on Hong Kong in June 2020, to conduct politically motivated arrests and prosecutions against individuals and groups affiliated with the pro-democracy movement. During the covered period, authorities arrested at least 51 individuals in connection with alleged violations of the NSL, including secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with a foreign country or external elements to endanger national security, which includes “provoking hatred” against the PRC or Hong Kong governments. Authorities filed charges against at least 82 individuals and organizations, including 47 activists and politicians detained on February 28, 2021, and subsequently charged them with subversion the following day in connection to the 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election. During the covered period, two individuals were found guilty of violating the NSL at trial, while four pled guilty to violating the NSL.

Authorities also detained, prosecuted, and imprisoned a growing number of individuals under colonial-era statutes on “sedition” and “unauthorized assembly.” With few exceptions, the individuals arrested and prosecuted under the NSL, or these colonial-era statutes were exercising freedoms guaranteed in the Basic Law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The NSL grants the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) broad authorities to conduct wiretaps, electronic surveillance, and searches without warrants in national security-related cases, and to require internet service providers to provide or delete information relevant to these cases. During the covered period there were credible reports that PRC security services and the Office of Safeguarding National Security (OSNS) monitored pro-democracy and human rights activists and journalists in Hong Kong.

Impact on Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law
The Sino-British Joint Declaration, as well as Hong Kong’s Basic Law, provide for an independent judiciary, but during the covered period PRC and Hong Kong authorities repeatedly took actions that eroded the judiciary’s independence and ability to uphold the rule of law, particularly in cases that Hong Kong authorities designated as involving national security. The NSL states the NPCSC, rather than Hong Kong courts, has the power to interpret the NSL. The Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong’s highest court, ruled in January 2021, that it had no power to find the NSL or any of its provisions unconstitutional or invalid based on incompatibility with the Basic Law or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. NPCSC decisions have the force of law in Hong Kong and are not subject to judicial review by Hong Kong courts.

The NSL provision that authorizes the mainland China judicial system to take over any national security-related case at the request of the Hong Kong government or the OSNS was not used during the covered period.

Local authorities consistently followed an NSL provision requiring the Hong Kong Chief Executive establish a list of judges to handle any cases concerning national security-related offenses. Although Hong Kong’s judiciary selects the specific judge(s) from a list of judges who may hear any individual case, legal scholars argued this unprecedented involvement of the chief executive weakens Hong Kong’s judicial independence. OSNS activities are not subject to Hong Kong legal jurisdiction, and decisions made by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security are not subject to judicial review under the NSL.

Under the NSL, in cases concerning offenses designated as endangering national security Hong Kong authorities may designate that a panel of three specially designated national security judges will hear a case instead of a jury. During the covered period, in the first NSL case to go to trial the Hong Kong Secretary for Justice issued a certificate for the case to be heard by such a three-judge panel after claiming, without providing justification, that there could be a potential risk to jurors.

The NSL empowers Hong Kong law enforcement authorities to freeze any assets they deem to be used for, intended to be used for, or otherwise related to an offense endangering national security. Hong Kong authorities used these powers regularly during the covered period to freeze assets belonging to civil society groups, media organizations, and other targets under investigation for pro-democracy activities.

The NSL increased the threshold for bail in national security-related cases. Under the NSL, defendants charged with national security-related offenses may not be granted bail unless the judge has sufficient grounds to believe the defendant or suspect will not continue to commit acts endangering national security. Under this higher threshold for bail, many defendants charged under the NSL remain in custody months after their initial detention. For example, a majority of the 47 individuals charged with subversion for involvement in the 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election remain detained without trial more than a year after their February 2021 detention. Police detained and charged these individuals en masse, then demanded lengthy delays to investigate and gather evidence against them. Some activists and scholars described these lengthy pre-trial detentions for nonviolent crimes as prejudicial to defendants’ rights and an infringement on the right to a fair trial.

On several occasions during the covered period, prosecutors argued for the denial of bail based on defendants’ routine interactions with foreign governments and media outlets. For example, former lawmaker Jeremy Tam was denied bail after prosecutors argued that an email invitation from a foreign consulate constituted evidence that he was still “of interest to foreign powers,” while another former lawmaker, Claudia Mo, was denied bail in part based on interviews and text messages with foreign press. Media executive Cheung Kim-hung was denied bail after prosecutors cited a statement by the Media Freedom Coalition, signed by 21 governments, and a separate statement from the UK Foreign Secretary criticizing Cheung’s arrest, claiming that these statements were evidence of a close association between Cheung and “foreign political groups.”

During the covered period, Hong Kong prosecutors and police increasingly designated cases as related to national security even if they did not involve alleged violations of the NSL itself, including prosecutions under the colonial-era sedition statute. Authorities argued that NSL procedures regarding bail, the use of a designated national security judge, and limits on the right to trial by jury also apply to these cases, effectively widening the applicability of the NSL. In December 2021, the Court of Final Appeal ruled that the NSL’s higher threshold for bail applies to all cases designated as involving national security, which some scholars argued would accelerate the impact of the NSL on other areas of Hong Kong’s legal system.

In October 2021, the Hong Kong Legal Aid Department announced that Hong Kong authorities would assign lawyers to provide legal aid recipients in criminal cases, and that each lawyer would only be able to accept a limited number of legal aid and judicial review cases each year.

During the covered period, PRC-controlled state media outlets in both Hong Kong and mainland China repeatedly accused Hong Kong judges of bias following the acquittals of protesters accused of rioting and other crimes. At least one judge reportedly emigrated from Hong Kong during the covered period after receiving criticism from state media outlets for rulings in protest-related cases.

Impact on Freedom of Speech or Expression
Hong Kong law provides protections for freedom of speech, but the government regularly took actions infringing on this right. Hong Kong and PRC authorities and PRC-controlled media outlets regularly described speech perceived to be critical of the PRC or Hong Kong governments as violating the NSL or sedition laws.

Authorities arrested and prosecuted activists for speech critical of the central or local governments or their policies, including on social media. In June 2021, Chow Hang-tung, the then-vice chair of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, was arrested and later charged and convicted for inciting unauthorized assembly because she urged people to “turn on the lights wherever you are” in remembrance of the Tiananmen Square massacre. In July 2021, officers from the HKPF National Security Department arrested and later charged five members of a labor union with “conspiring to publish seditious publications” after the union published a series of children’s books that implicitly referred to the 2019 pro-democracy movement. Authorities subsequently froze the union’s assets and canceled the union’s registration for alleged activities inconsistent with the union’s stated objectives. Hong Kong officials accused the books of “inciting hatred” and “poisoning” children’s minds against the PRC and Hong Kong governments.

During the covered period, Hong Kong authorities repeatedly targeted freedom of expression in connection with the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. In June 2021, authorities raided a museum dedicated to memorializing the massacre, following allegations that the museum did not have the appropriate license. The museum closed later that month. In December 2021, three Hong Kong universities removed and dismantled sculptures and artworks commemorating the massacre from their campuses, citing unspecified legal risks. The removal of at least one of the sculptures came despite an ongoing legal dispute regarding the sculpture’s ownership and an offer from the sculpture’s creator to remove the art from Hong Kong.

Prosecutors argued in multiple court hearings that the phrase “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times,” a common slogan of the 2019 pro-democracy protests, contained an inherent meaning of support for Hong Kong independence and/or a change in Hong Kong’s constitutional status. During the covered period, courts convicted two individuals of violating the NSL on that basis. Scholars and activists have argued the courts’ decisions failed to take into consideration protections for freedom of speech or expression enshrined in the Basic Law, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the NSL itself.

In May 2021, Hong Kong authorities passed new legislation that criminalized inciting others not to vote or to cast blank ballots. Violators are subject to up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine. Authorities arrested at least ten individuals during the covered period for social media posts allegedly urging others to cast blank or invalid ballots and filed charges against at least two.

Legal experts described the legislation as conflicting with common law norms that criminalize incitement only when the behavior exhorted is itself illegal. Hong Kong officials have also claimed inciting others to boycott elections or cast blank ballots may violate the NSL.

Hong Kong law prohibits acts deemed to abuse or desecrate the PRC national flag or anthem. In September 2021, Hong Kong authorities amended the legislation to criminalize desecrating the national flag or anthem online, such as by posting an image of a “defiled” national flag on social media. During the covered period, at least three individuals were arrested for allegedly desecrating the flag or insulting the anthem.

In October 2021, LegCo passed a broad and vaguely drafted criminal film censorship law that empowers Hong Kong authorities to revoke a film’s license if “found to be contrary to national security interests.” Violators are subject to up to three years’ imprisonment.

Hong Kong authorities continued efforts to restrict the freedom of expression of individuals overseas under both the NSL and other legislation, including by issuing arrest warrants purely based on extraterritorial speech. There are reportedly NSL-related arrest warrants against 30 individuals residing outside Hong Kong, including U.S. citizens. Although reported in PRC state-controlled media, Hong Kong authorities have refused to acknowledge the existence of these warrants. In addition, the HKPF announced in December 2021 it had issued arrest warrants for at least seven Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and former elected officials now residing overseas for social media posts urging Hong Kong residents to boycott or cast blank ballots in the LegCo election that month.

Impact on Freedom of the Press
The Basic Law provides for freedom of the press, which is guaranteed under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, but PRC and Hong Kong authorities repeatedly violated this freedom by targeting independent media, resulting in unprecedented pressure on local independent media outlets in Hong Kong. In June 2021, HKPF National Security Department officers raided the offices of Apple Daily, an independent newspaper and online news platform; arrested seven executives, editors, and writers of Apple Daily and its parent company Next Digital and charged them with collusion with a foreign country or external elements under the NSL; and froze assets belonging to the company. Apple Daily subsequently ceased all operations.

In December 2021, police officers from the National Security Department arrested seven individuals associated with the pro-democracy online media outlet Stand News on suspicion of “conspiracy to print or distribute seditious materials” under the colonial-era sedition law. Police also raided the media outlet’s office, arrested staff members, seized journalistic materials, and froze its assets. Stand News subsequently announced it was ceasing operations and laying off its staff. Several other independent media outlets also announced their closure following the raid on Stand News, with some stating publicly that journalism had become too dangerous in Hong Kong. Citizen News closed in January 2022, for example, citing concerns over the safety of its staff.

PRC and Hong Kong officials, as well as PRC-controlled media, repeatedly criticized the Hong Kong Journalists Association during the covered period and accused the organization of potential NSL violations. In July 2021, the association released a report titled “Freedom in Tatters” outlining the erosion of press freedoms in Hong Kong. PRC officials also criticized the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Hong Kong (FCC) on several occasions, including in November 2021 after the FCC published the results of a member survey showing that respondents believed the NSL caused Hong Kong’s media environment to change for the worse, and in December 2021 after the FCC released a statement expressing concern about the shuttering of Stand News.

During the covered period, pro-Beijing media and politicians accused government-owned public broadcaster RTHK of exercising little editorial oversight, being anti-police and anti-government, and thus violating the NSL. The Special Administrative Region (SAR) government subsequently forced out the managing director and replaced him with a pro-Beijing civil servant with no broadcasting experience. RTHK civil service employees were given a deadline to swear loyalty oaths, leading many to resign. Under its new management, RTHK also fired presenters, cancelled shows, and censored content based on political perspective.

Hong Kong authorities threatened foreign media outlets with legal consequences for the content of their editorials. In December 2021, a Hong Kong official sent a letter to the Wall Street Journal stating that “we reserve the right to take necessary action” against any incitement not to vote or to cast invalid votes, after the newspaper published an editorial criticizing the LegCo election. Hong Kong authorities also issued criticisms of other international outlets’ reporting and editorials, including The Economist, El Pais, La Libre, and the Sunday Times.

Hong Kong authorities have arrested and charged local reporters during the covered period for using publicly available governmental databases to investigate incidents during the 2019 protests. In addition, Hong Kong authorities implemented measures that limit public access to multiple public government databases, most notably the Hong Kong Companies Registry, including by requiring users accessing the Registry to disclose their names and identification numbers, and by restricting the information on company directors and addresses available in the Registry, with no exceptions available to journalists.

As noted in previous reports, the Department of State has no information indicating Hong Kong agents, persons, or entities were involved in the extrajudicial surveillance, abduction, detention, or forced confessions of certain booksellers and journalists.

[May35]

Impact on Internet Freedoms
Hong Kong authorities did not generally disrupt open access to the Internet, but there were numerous reports that Hong Kong police, exercising powers granted by the NSL, required internet providers to block access to certain websites, including those associated with the pro-democracy movement and a museum on the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Hong Kong authorities refused to confirm the reports. In June 2021, an Israel-based web hosting company briefly removed a website associated with the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement after Hong Kong police sent the company a letter claiming the website contained messages “likely to constitute offenses endangering national security.” The company subsequently reinstated the website.

Some activists claimed authorities monitored their email and internet use. Messages posted on Facebook, Telegram, and LIHKG.com (a local forum website) led to arrests under the NSL and the Public Order Ordinance, causing concern and self-censorship by individuals and organizations. Under the NSL, when investigating alleged offenses, they deem to threaten national security the National Security Department of the HKPF may require the person who published information or the relevant service provider to remove the content or otherwise provide assistance to the authorities. After the imposition of the NSL, major international social media firms and other technology companies announced they would no longer comply with requests from the HKPF for user information or to remove content.

Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter reported denying Hong Kong authorities’ user information and content takedown requests during the covered period. Google reported releasing data to Hong Kong authorities on three occasions during the covered period, once due to a credible threat to life and twice in connection with suspected trafficking in persons.

In October 2021, Hong Kong passed the Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021, criminalizing a broad definition of doxing, which observers fear could include anyone, including journalists, who criticize public officials online or in electronic communications. It also strengthened Hong Kong’s legal basis for demanding tech companies comply with user information and content takedown requests or potentially face criminal charges.

Impact on Freedom of Assembly
Hong Kong law provides for protection of freedom of assembly, but Hong Kong authorities violated this right during the covered period, especially for individuals and organizations associated with the pro-democracy movement. Under Hong Kong law, organizers of public meetings and demonstrations are required to apply for a “letter of no objection” from police, but the police did not issue any such letters to groups not affiliated with the PRC or Hong Kong governments during the covered period, effectively banning all protests. Authorities cited COVID-19 restrictions to refuse authorization for assemblies, although civil rights organizations said the intent of the denials was aimed at preventing political gatherings rather than promoting public health. In June 2021, for the second consecutive year, police refused to grant approval to an annual vigil to commemorate the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, citing COVID-19-related social distancing concerns.

During the covered period, Hong Kong authorities arrested and prosecuted activists and opposition politicians for allegedly organizing and taking part in unauthorized nonviolent demonstrations. For example, in April 2021, a Hong Kong court convicted veteran pro-democracy activists including Martin Lee, Margaret Ng, Jimmy Lai, and Lee Cheuk-yan of unauthorized assembly for their participation in a nonviolent August 2019 protest. Authorities arrested 33 people and filed charges against 30 during the covered period in connection with commemorations of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 2020 or 2021. In September 2021, seven pro-democracy activists were sentenced to up to 16 months in jail for their role in an “unauthorized assembly” at the height of the anti-government protests in 2019. Judge Amanda Woodcock told the District Court that while the city’s mini constitution “guarantees freedom of assembly, procession and demonstration,” those rights are “not absolute.”

Impact on Freedom of Association
PRC and Hong Kong authorities disregarded freedom of association as enshrined in the Basic Law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. PRC and Hong Kong authorities repeatedly used threats, investigations, arrests, asset freezes, and other actions to force the closure of groups they deemed a “national security” concern for their involvement in the pro-democracy movement. According to media reports more than 40 civil society organizations, labor unions, and political parties disbanded during the covered period. Many groups cited increasing legal risks following the imposition of the NSL.

In August 2021, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, the city’s largest professional trade union with approximately 95,000 members, chose to dissolve after PRC-controlled media called the union a “poisonous tumor” to be eradicated and Hong Kong authorities announced they would cease working with the union and investigate possible legal violations. PRC-controlled media also accused the Professional Teachers’ Union of foreign collusion for its involvement in Education International, a global federation of teachers’ unions. In October 2021, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, a confederation of more than 80 unions with more than 100,000 members, dissolved after PRC-controlled media outlets accused it of being a “foreign agent” in violation of the NSL due to its affiliation with the International Trade Union Confederation.

In September 2021, Hong Kong police charged the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, a pro-democracy group organizing annual vigils to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and seven of its leaders with violating the NSL, and accused the group of being a “foreign agent.” Hong Kong authorities subsequently froze the group’s assets and ordered that the group be removed from Hong Kong’s Companies Registry.

Other groups that disbanded during the covered period included the Civil Human Rights Front, which previously organized large-scale annual nonviolent pro-democracy protests; the 612 Humanitarian Fund, which used crowdfunding methods to support emergency financial and legal assistance for persons injured or arrested during the 2019 pro-democracy protests; and the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, which advocated for human rights lawyers and human rights defenders in mainland China. All faced public accusations of illegal activities from Hong Kong or PRC authorities or PRC-controlled media.

In October 2021, Amnesty International announced it would close its local and regional offices in Hong Kong by the end of 2021.

The group announced that the NSL “made it effectively impossible for human rights organizations in Hong Kong to work freely and without fear of serious reprisals from the government.”

Impact on Freedom of Movement
Hong Kong law provides for freedom of movement, including internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and voluntary return, but during the covered period the government restricted enjoyment of this right for certain individuals. Hong Kong law enforcement continued to use a provision of the NSL to seize travel documents from democracy activists and opposition politicians arrested under the NSL, even without filing charges. Hong Kong prosecutors also asked courts to confiscate travel documents or enforce travel bans for activists, protesters, and politicians on bail while facing charges for crimes related to political activity and expression, including nonviolent participation in anti-government protests, under both the NSL and other statutes.

In June 2021 after the closure of Apple Daily, Hong Kong authorities arrested a senior editor at Hong Kong International Airport. This editor had not previously been charged, and credible media reports indicated Hong Kong authorities maintained an exit ban “watchlist” of residents who would be intercepted if they attempted to leave Hong Kong.

Hong Kong authorities enacted an immigration bill amendment that went into effect in August 2021. The legal sector, NGOs, and refugee advocates expressed concern that the amendment empowered Hong Kong authorities to bar anyone, without a court order, from entering or leaving Hong Kong.

Impact on Education and Academic Freedom
During the covered period, Hong Kong authorities, under direction from the PRC, took repeated steps to restrict political expression in schools and universities and to threaten or penalize teachers and academics who expressed dissenting opinions.

The NSL requires Hong Kong authorities to promote “national security education” in schools and universities. During the covered period, the Hong Kong Education Bureau began implementing a national security education curriculum at all grade levels in government-funded schools, as well as, to a lesser extent, in international and private schools, based on guidelines issued in February 2021. The Education Bureau also instructed schools to prevent and suppress any curriculum and activities that are in breach of the NSL, the Basic Law, or other Hong Kong law. Under the guidelines, schools are required to limit political expression and activities on school campuses and to support periodic reports regarding their implementation of “national security education.”

In October 2021, the Education Bureau released guidelines requiring all government-funded schools to hold weekly flag-raising ceremonies.

Hong Kong and PRC officials, as well as PRC-controlled media, repeatedly accused Hong Kong teachers of failing to provide “patriotic education” to their students, which they claimed was a root cause of the 2019 pro-democracy movement. PRC-controlled media accused the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union of disseminating “poisonous thoughts” into schools and urged Hong Kong law enforcement to investigate the union, even after the group announced it would disband. Hong Kong authorities continued to encourage teachers to avoid voicing political opinions, including on social media. There were reports that university professors were denied tenure, promotions, or contact renewals because of their political opinions or expressions.

In July 2021, police raided the office of the student union at the University of Hong Kong after the union’s council passed a motion expressing “sadness” at the death of an individual who attacked a police officer on the July 1 anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to PRC sovereignty. The union later apologized and retracted the motion. Under pressure from Hong Kong authorities, university leadership barred the students who attended the council meeting from campus and severed ties with the student union. In August 2021, police arrested four members of the student union on suspicion of “advocating terrorism” under the NSL.

Impact on Freedom of Religion or Belief
Hong Kong authorities generally respected freedom of religion or belief. During the covered period, most religious leaders and advocates stated the NSL did not negatively impact religious practitioners’ ability to worship in line with their religious norms and without government interference. However, groups continued to express concern about self-censorship and potential PRC targeting of civil society organizations or individuals affiliated with religious groups that were active in the 2019 pro-democracy movement. There were reports that several religious leaders who had criticized the NSL or supported the pro-democracy movement relocated abroad out of fear of retaliation from Hong Kong authorities. Authorities curtailed activities of Falun Gong practitioners during the covered period, including banning their street kiosks for allegedly violating COVID-19 protocols. In July 2021, several members of LegCo urged the Hong Kong government to outlaw the Falun Dafa Association under the NSL.

[May35]

Disinformation/Political Influence Activities
Media organizations owned directly or indirectly by the PRC are actively conducting disinformation activities in Hong Kong.

The main thrust of the disinformation is aimed at painting “foreign forces” as fomenters of unrest in Hong Kong and deflecting attention away from the demands of people in Hong Kong and their criticism of the PRC or Hong Kong governments. Additionally, mainland China-based actors have resorted to coercive measures including doxing and malicious cyber activities, to intimidate Hongkongers and silence pro-democracy speech online. In September 2021, the Wikimedia Foundation announced that, in an “unprecedented” move, it had banned seven Wikipedia users and stripped an additional twelve users of administrator privileges after media reports revealed a group of mainland China-based editors had been removing content contributed by Hong Kong residents, rewriting articles about Hong Kong from a pro-Beijing perspective, and threatening to dox pro-democracy Hong Kong editors. In November 2021, Google’s Threat Analysis Group published evidence that a “likely state-backed” actor used a watering hole cyber method against a Hong Kong media outlet and a prominent pro-democracy labor and political group.

Impact on U.S.-Hong Kong Exchanges
U.S. institutions typically conduct a wide range of academic, cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges with Hong Kong counterparts, but the COVID-19 pandemic halted most international programs on Hong Kong campuses as well as all ECA-funded exchange programs with Hong Kong. Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong Normalization (E.O. 13936) resulted in the termination of the Hong Kong Fulbright program in July 2020.

Impact on U.S. Citizens
In 2021, an estimated 85,000 U.S. citizens lived in Hong Kong. However, that number is now estimated to be approximately 70,000, as many have departed – temporarily or permanently – due to COVID-19 mitigation policies and other factors. Non-residents were not generally permitted to visit Hong Kong in 2021 due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, with few exceptions. Since the imposition of the NSL in June 2020, the PRC increasingly exercised police and security power in Hong Kong, subjecting U.S. citizens who are publicly critical of the PRC to a heightened risk of arrest, detention, expulsion, or prosecution in Hong Kong. In January 2021, the HKPF arrested a U.S. citizen under the NSL.

U.S.-Hong Kong Cooperation and Agreements
The United States and Hong Kong continue to maintain several bilateral agreements regarding issues such as taxation, parcel delivery, and air transportation services.

During the covered period, due to Hong Kong authorities’ 2020 notification of their purported suspension of an agreement concerning mutual legal assistance in criminal affairs, the U.S. government made official requests for mutual legal assistance under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and UN Convention against Corruption with limited success. U.S. law enforcement had no engagement with the HKPF National Security Department, but U.S. law enforcement agencies continued to cooperate with other Hong Kong law enforcement counterparts to counter trafficking in persons, trade fraud, wildlife trafficking, child exploitation, drug trafficking, IPR theft, financial crimes, money laundering, and international terrorism.

Sanctions Engagement
The United States communicated regularly with Hong Kong authorities through demarches and notifications on issues involving sanctions implementation, including actions taken by the Department of the Treasury against several Hong Kong-registered entities under sanctions authorities related to China and counterterrorism.

Actions Taken by the U.S. Government
During the covered period, the U.S. government imposed financial sanctions on seven PRC officials under E.O. 13936 in connection with actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of Hong Kong. Under Section 7 of the E.O., those designated for financial sanctions and their immediate family members are also subject to visa restrictions. In March and December of 2021, the Department of State submitted reports under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA) identifying 29 officials also sanctioned under E.O. 13936 who have materially contributed to the failure of the PRC to meet its obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Basic Law, as this is defined by the HKAA. In July 2021, the Department of State, along with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security, issued a business advisory regarding emerging risks to their operations and activities in Hong Kong, including those stemming from the implementation of the NSL and other legislative changes. In August 2021, in response to the significant erosion of rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, President Biden directed the deferral of removal of certain Hong Kong residents who are present in the United States.

At various times during the covered period, in response to PRC and Hong Kong authorities’ actions, the United States issued statements, often with likeminded partners, raising concerns and calling for those authorities to respect Hong Kong’s promised high degree of autonomy.

Areas of Remaining Autonomy
On March 5, 2022 PRC Premier Li Keqiang asserted that Beijing intends to exercise “overall jurisdiction over the two SARs,” referring to Hong Kong and Macau. Li’s remarks accompanied the first ever mention in the PRC’s Central Government Report of policies that would ensure the governance of Hong Kong by the PRC and allow only “patriots” to serve in positions of authority in the territory. Although Hong Kong’s economic and financial systems remain distinct in many respects from mainland China’s, the differences have narrowed, and business and rule of law risks that were formerly limited to mainland China are now increasingly a concern in Hong Kong. It is in the political sphere where the differences between Hong Kong and mainland China have narrowed the most. Over the reporting period, space for civil society in Hong Kong also contracted.

Hong Kong continued to exercise authority in the implementation of commercial agreements and practiced free and open trade, with negligible tariff or non-tariff barriers. The Hong Kong legal system continued to be based on common-law traditions. The imposition of the NSL and pressure from the PRC did, however, raise serious concerns about the judicial system’s continued independence. Property rights were well-protected in law and practice. Hong Kong maintained its own currency, pegged to the U.S. dollar. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority set monetary policy autonomously from the People’s Bank of China.

Hong Kong sets its own data regulations and does not have any broad data localization requirements. Under mainland China’s cross-border data transfer requirements, Hong Kong is considered outside of China and is treated the same as foreign jurisdictions.

Draft Regulations on the Administration of Network Data Security published by the PRC Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) would require PRC companies that handle the personal information of more than 1 million individuals to submit to a CAC network review before seeking public listings on foreign stock exchanges. The draft regulations appear to exempt listings in Hong Kong from this requirement, but the draft includes an ambiguous reference to national security concerns for listing.

In August 2021, despite intense media speculation, the PRC National People’s Congress did not vote to impose the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to Hong Kong, which could have exposed firms in Hong Kong to criminal and civil penalties for complying with foreign sanctions requirements.

The debate over whether to apply this law raised questions about the extent to which Hong Kong’s legal and regulatory environment might be harmonized with that of the mainland, which would considerably undermine the Hong Kong investment climate while significantly elevating political and legal risk faced by firms operating in that jurisdiction.

Hong Kong appears to have wide latitude in setting policies on climate and green finance. It has its own carbon neutrality goal of 2050 and aims to eliminate the use of coal for daily electricity generation by 2035, both significantly more ambitious than mainland China’s climate goals, and Hong Kong authorities have released a detailed plan for achieving these goals. In green finance, Hong Kong has set stricter climate disclosure requirements, aligned with international best practices, than mainland China.

Hong Kong continues to vote separately from mainland China in a number of international organizations and multilateral entities, including the Financial Action Task Force, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the International Olympic Committee, and the World Trade Organization, and participates autonomously in various green finance multilateral fora. The extent to which PRC authorities influence Hong Kong votes and actions is unclear. In some organizations, there were reports Hong Kong’s representatives acted on behalf of PRC authorities to advance PRC political objectives, including by preventing Taiwan from participating meaningfully in the WTO, in which it is a member, and from assuming leadership positions, indicating that Hong Kong’s ability to participate autonomously in these organizations may be eroding.

Export Controls
Since December 23, 2020, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry (BIS) has reviewed transactions involving Hong Kong under the same export control policy as any other Chinese destination. Also in December 2020, BIS created and published the “Military End User List.” Three Hong Kong companies are listed as “military end users” for their known support of foreign militaries, one of them notably being the Hong Kong Government Flying Service, for its support of the PRC People’s Liberation Army. As a result, a BIS license is required for certain exports, reexports, and in-country transfers when a party has knowledge that a military end user is a party to the transaction (e.g., as purchaser, intermediate consignee, ultimate consignee, or end user).

Hong Kong Policy Act Findings
In July 2020, then-President Trump issued E.O. 13936, which addressed the suspension of the application of Section 201(a) of the Hong Kong Policy Act to certain U.S. laws. E.O. 13936 remains in effect. There were no terminations under section 202(d) or determinations under section 201(b) of the Act during the covered period.

[May35]

Hong Kong’s Diminishing Freedoms
https://www.state.gov/hong-kongs-diminishing-freedoms/

Over the past year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continued to dismantle Hong Kong’s democratic institutions, placed unprecedented pressure on the judiciary, and stifled academic, cultural, and press freedoms. As the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to Beijing approaches, Hong Kong’s freedoms are diminishing while the PRC tightens its rule.The differences between Hong Kong and cities in mainland China are shrinking due to ongoing repression from the PRC.

This year’s Hong Kong Policy Act Report documents actions taken by leaders in Hong Kong and the PRC that have further eroded both democratic institutions and human rights, and profoundly impaired independent media operations and freedom of expression. These policies have far-reaching implications for all aspects of life in the city, including for the international business and financial communities.

Sweeping arrests of Hong Kong residents, as well as the forced closure of institutions including Apple Daily and the June 4 Museum, underscore the scope of these deeply damaging changes. In response to heightened risk and uncertainty, some international firms in Hong Kong have relocated entirely, while others have shifted key staff or operations elsewhere. Beijing will ultimately force many of the city’s best and brightest to flee, tarnishing Hong Kong’s reputation and weakening its competitiveness. Hong Kong’s position as a free, global financial center will continue to suffer as a result.

A fully functioning civil society, rule of law, and individual liberties form the bedrock on which vibrant societies grow. We stand with people in Hong Kong.

[May35]

2022香港政策法案
https://hk.usconsulate.gov/zhhk/n-2022033101-zh/

提交國會
與美國相關的香港狀況報告
2019財政年度John S. McCain國防授權法第1256節
(PL 115-232) (22 U.S.C.5731)

為遵照美國-香港政策法案1992 (「法案」) (22 U.S.C. 5725 及 5731) 的第205及301節以及國務院、外交行動及相關計劃撥款法案2022 (Div. K, P.L. 117-103) 的第7043(f)(3)©節的要求，美國國務院就香港自2021年3月至2022年3月(「該期間」) 的狀況提交本報告及隨附的證明。

撮要

按美國國務院的評估，中華人民共和國中央人民政府在該期間所採取的新行動直接對美國在港利益構成危害，同時該等行動不符合基本法及在中英聯合聲明下，中國承諾給予香港享有高度自治的責任。在核證美國法律下給予香港的待遇一事上，國務卿核實，按照美國法律，香港不應獲得如同它在1997年7月1號前按美國法律所得到的待遇。

在該期間，中國當局採取行動，令香港的民主反對派無法再在香港的管治中擔當具實質意義的角色，亦變相把批評中央及香港政府的和平政治表達刑事化。中國人大常委會通過一項決議， 對香港的選舉制度作出巨大改動，從而阻止北京不認可的政治團體參與選舉。這將大幅度地削減香港選民選擇其屬意代表的權利。
中國及香港當局針對與該地區民主運動有聯繫的團體、協會、媒體及工會，對其進行搜查、拘捕、檢控及資產凍結，從而引起寒蟬效應及迫使它們及其他組織停運，當中包括兩個香港最大的獨立媒體機構 ── 蘋果日報及立場新聞。透過北京的支持，香港當局繼續以中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法（國安法）壓制自由及權利，包括在基本法和中英聯合聲明中獲得保障的各項自由。香港警方及檢控人員引用國安法，在沒有審訊的情況下，長期拘留牽涉非暴力政治表述或活動的人士，包括將47名社運人士及政治人物起訴，並以其在2020年7月所參與的一項非官方初選爲由，對他們控以顛覆國家罪。該等被控以觸犯國安法的人士被拒保釋，除非法官有足夠理由相信被告不會繼續從事危害國家安全的行爲，而這是在國安法下一項極爲空泛及含糊的標準。此外，香港當局對紀念1989年天安門屠殺事件的活動及文化藝術品予以限制，並且將最少33名涉及上述活動的人士拘捕、起訴或定罪。

對民主制度及普選的影響

在該期間，中國及香港當局刻意限制香港選民投選他們屬意的代表，同時中國官員前所未有地操控香港的選舉結果。在2021年3月，人大常委會，即中國立法機關的最高單位，作出一項改變香港選舉制度的決定，令北京當局可以全面控制任何未來選舉的結果。該「決定」訂明，所有公職候選人必須為「愛國者」並要求他們通過繁複的提名及審查過程，審查結果亦不得上訴。「決定」對推選香港行政長官的行政長官選舉委員會作出變更，令該委員會的選民數目減少了97%，並構建一個制度，從而令在2021年9月行政長官選舉委員會選舉所產生的新一屆行政長官選舉委員會，其1500席中超過1100席均為自動當選。同時該決定亦更改了立法會的組成。在新制度下，香港選民僅直接選出立法會90名成員中的20位，有別於以往70席中的40席。行政長官選舉委員會直接選出40名立法會成員，而餘下30席則為各經濟及專業界別的功能組別代表，此等改變違反基本法對行政長官及立法會選舉的條文，即該等選舉以達致普選為「最終目標」。

在2021年9月及12月的行政長官選舉委員會及立法會選舉中，親北京的候選人分別在這兩個機構中只差一席即能囊括全部議席。

在2021年12月的立法會選舉中，並沒有主要的反對派政黨派出候選人出選。他們經常解釋其決定乃基於他們多名領導人物及成員均由於政治控罪而被拘留或監禁。該次立法會選舉的投票率僅為30.2% （扣除白票及廢票則為29.6% ），創歷屆立法會選舉的新低。

在2021年5月，香港當局在國安法下通過新法例，要求所有區議會當選議員宣誓效忠北京。區議會為香港僅有完全通過普選產生的代議組織，而泛民反對陣營在2019年的區議會選舉中，在479席中贏得388席。新法例通過後，香港官員告知香港傳媒，那些曾作宣誓但及後因其作誓「並不真誠」而被裁定喪失議員資格者，或須向港府償還薪金及開支，數目可高達數十萬美元。超過260名區議員因而辭職，並沒有進行宣誓。香港當局其後在2021年9月及10月為餘下的區議員進行效忠宣誓，並取消當中49名泛民主派區議員的資格，同時不得上訴。據本地觀察人士評估，香港當局透過實施宣誓效忠、對區議員施加請辭壓力以及取消數以十計的當選議員的資格，從而將2019年區議會選舉的結果推翻，並打破泛民陣營對區議會的掌控。

在2021年8月，香港政務司司長宣布鄭松泰，即當時立法會內兩位非親北京陣營議員中的其中一位，不能通過審查程序，因而無法參與競逐行政長官選舉委員會委員席位。這亦導致他即時喪失其立法會議席。

據傳媒報道，中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室 ── 即中國在香港的主要代表處 ── 的官員積極為2021年12月的立法會選舉招募參選人。在立法會選舉前多個場合中，中國國務院港澳辦公室作出評論，論述符合參加香港選舉的「愛國者」標準。

對警務及保安工作的影響

香港當局運用人大常委會在2020年於香港實施的國安法，對與民主運動有關的個人及團體，進行政治逮捕及檢控。在該期間，當局拘捕至少51名涉及違反國安法的人士，控罪包括分裂國家、顛覆政權、恐怖活動以及勾結外國或外部勢力而危害國家安全，當中包括針對中國或香港政府「挑起仇恨」。當局對至少82位個人或組織進行起訴，當中包括47名在2021年2月28日遭拘留的社運人士及政治人物。他們在被拘留翌日，就其所牽涉的2020年非官方泛民初選被控以顛覆罪。在該期間，兩名人士經審訊後被裁定違反國安法罪名成立，而4名人士承認其國安法控罪。

當局亦引用殖民地時代有關「煽動」及「非法集會」的法律，對越來越多的人士進行拘留、檢控及監禁。除少數例外情況外，在國安法或上述殖民地法律下遭逮捕或檢控的人士，只不過是在行使其自由權利，而這些自由均受基本法及國際公民和政治權利公約所保障。

國安法授予香港警方廣泛權力，在涉及國安法案件中，可在無需授權令下，進行竊聽、電子跟蹤及搜查。國安法亦授權當局指令互聯網服務供應商提供或者刪除涉及該等案件的資料。可靠的報告指出，中國國安機構及國安署在該期間監視在港的民主及人權社運人士以及新聞從業員。

對司法獨立及法治的影響

中英聯合聲明及香港基本法均訂明香港司法獨立，惟在該期間，中國及香港當局不斷採取行動，蠶食香港的司法獨立及維護法治的能力，尤其對於那些香港當局認定為涉及國家安全的案件。國安法訂明，解釋國安法的權力乃屬於人大常委會而非香港法院。終審法院，即香港的最高法院，在2021年1月裁定，它本身並無權力基於國安法或其任何條文與基本法或國際公民和政治權利公約的不相符，從而裁定國安法或其條文違憲或無效。人大常委會的決定在香港具等同法律的效力，同時亦不受香港法院的司法覆核。

國安法授權中國司法系統，可以在香港政府或中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的提請下，接管任何與國家安全相關的案件，惟該條款在期間並未被引用。

香港當局全面遵從國安法中，要求香港行政長官訂立一份法官名單，以處理涉及國家安全的罪行。雖然主審個別案件的指定法官是由司法機關從該法官名單中選出，法律學者認為行政長官史無前例的介入，令香港的司法獨立受到削弱。再者，國安公署的活動超然於香港的司法管轄，同時香港政府國家安全委員會的所有決定在國安法下亦免受司法覆核。

在國安法下，香港當局有權委派三位國安指定法官，以審理被定性為涉及危害國家安全的案件，而該法官團組將會取代陪審團審理該等案件。律政司司長在該期間曾發出証書，讓香港首宗國安法案件的聆訊，由該等三人法官團組負責聆訊。律政司司長在未有提供理據下辯稱，該做法是基於該案件對陪審員會構成潛在風險。

國安法授權香港執法機關凍結任何當局認為會用於、計劃用於又或者涉及危害國家安全罪行的資產。香港當局在該期間慣常運用這些權力，從而凍結運用於民主活動並且屬於公民社會組織、傳媒機構及其他遭調查目標的資產。

國安法提高了國家安全案件的保釋門檻。在國安法下，被控國安法相關罪行的被告不得保釋，除非相關法官有足夠理由相信，被告或疑犯不會持續從事危害國家安全的行為。在此較高的保釋門檻下，許多國安法下的被告從最初被拘留後，一直遭囚禁多月。例如，因參與2020年非官方泛民初選而被控以顛覆罪的47名人士當中，大部份在未經審訊下被拘留超過一年，時間始自2021年2月。警方將他們集體羈留及檢控，然後以調查及對其蒐集證據為由，要求法庭長時間押後聆訊。一些社運人士及學者將這些對非暴力罪案施加冗長的審前拘留，形容為對被告權利的損害以及侵害其得到公平審訊的權利。

在該期間，檢控官數次以被告慣常與外國政府與傳媒聯絡為由，要求法庭拒絕被告的保釋申請。例如，前立法會議員譚文豪的保釋不獲批准，事緣檢控官辯稱一封外國領事向他發出的邀請電郵顯示「外國勢力仍然對他有興趣」。此外，另一名前議員毛孟靜被拒保釋，部份原因為她，接受外媒的訪問以及她與後者的文字訊息往來。傳媒行政人員張劍虹亦被拒保釋，原因是檢控官援引一項21國政府聯署並由傳媒自由聯盟所發出的聲明，以及另一份由英國外交大臣所發出批評逮捕張氏的聲明，並辯稱該等聲明證明張氏與「外國政治團體」關係密切。

在該期間，香港檢察官及警方日益頻密地將案件列為與國家安全有關，儘管該等案件並沒有涉及違反國安法，同時他們亦引用殖民地時代的煽動法例作出起訴。當局辯稱，國安法中涉及保釋、國安法官的任用以至就陪審團審理案件的權利設限的各項程序同樣適用於此等案件，亦即變相擴大國安法的適用範圍。在2021年12月，終審法院裁定，國安法下較高的保釋門檻適用於所有被界定為牽涉國家安全的案件。一些學者指出，這將會加速國安法對香港法律制度中其他領域的衝擊。

在2021年10月，香港法律援助署宣布，香港當局將會為刑事案件的法援受助人指派律師，而每位律師每年只可受理有限度數目的法援個案及司法覆核案件。

在該期間，受中國操控的官媒，不論在香港或者在中國大陸，不斷指控某些香港法官在處理案件上有所偏頗——指稱他們將被控以暴動及其他罪行的示威者判以無罪釋放。在該期間，據報至少一名法官移民離港，而他於離港前，官媒曾就其對抗議案件的裁決，對他作出抨擊。

對言論或表達自由的影響

香港法律保障言論自由，惟政府經常採取行動，侵害此權利。香港及中國當局以至中國操控的傳媒，經常把被視為批評中國或香港政府的言論描述為違反國安法或煽動法例。

當局拘捕及起訴社運人士，因其言論對中央或本地政府或政策有所批評，這包括他們在社交媒體上的言論。在2021年6月，時任支聯會副主席周幸彤被捕。及後她被起訴及定罪，罪名是煽動非法集會，因為她鼓動羣衆「無論身處何方都得點起燈光」以悼念天安門屠殺事件。在2021年7月，警方國安處人員拘捕並及後起訴五名工會成員，控以「串謀出版煽動性刊物」。該工會此前曾發行一系列兒童書冊，内容被指影射2019年民主運動。當局其後凍結該工會的資產，同時取消其工會註冊，理由為它所涉及的行為有違其申報的組織宗旨。香港當局指責該等刊物對中國及香港政府「挑起仇恨」及「毒害」兒童的心智。

在該期間，香港當局不斷針對涉及1989年天安門屠殺事件的言論表達自由。在2021年6月，當局聲稱基於欠缺相關牌照，對一間專門紀念天安門屠殺事件而設立的紀念館進行搜查；及後該館在當月關閉。在2021年12月，香港三所大學基於沒有指明的法律風險，從校園把紀念該屠殺事件的雕像及藝術品拆除及移走。在當中一項雕像的移除事件中，縱使該雕像擁有權的法律爭議持續，同時其創作人提出將其移離香港的意願，有關當局仍然進行移除行動。

在多次法庭聆訊中，檢控官辯稱「光復香港 時代革命」 ── 一句在2019年民主運動常見的口號 ── 隱含了支持香港獨立及/或改變香港憲制地位的意思。在該期間，法院基於該理據將兩名人士定罪，裁定他們違反國安法。學者及社運人士均稱，法院的判決並未考慮到對言論及表達自由的保障，而該等自由在基本法、國際公民及政治公約以及國安法本身之下皆得到保障。

在2021年5月，香港當局通過新法例，將煽動他人不投票或投白票刑事化，違者可被判以3年監禁及罰款。在該期間，當局拘捕至少十名人士，因其涉嫌鼓勵他人投白票或廢票，同時對其中至少兩人進行起訴。

法律專家稱，上述法例與普通法下的慣例並不相符，即在普通法下就煽動行為而言，只會在被力勸進行的行為本身屬於違法行爲的情況下才會將有關的煽動行為列為刑事罪行。香港官員同時聲稱，煽動他人杯葛選舉或投白票或會觸犯國安法。

香港法例禁止濫用或褻瀆中國國旗或國歌。在2021年9月，香港當局修訂法例，將網上褻瀆國旗或國歌刑事化，例子之一是將一幅經改動的國旗上載社交平台。在該期間，至少三名人士因涉嫌褻瀆國旗或悔辱國歌而被捕。

在2021年10月，立法會通過一項適用範圍廣闊且行文含糊的刑事電影檢查條例，授權香港當局若認為某影片有違國家安全利益者，可將其牌照吊銷，違者最高可被判三年監禁。

香港當局持續採取行動，以國安法及其他法例收窄海外人士的表達自由，方法包括純粹基於境外言論而發出拘捕令。據報當局針對30位身處外地人士，發出拘捕令，當中包括美國公民。儘管這些報道源自中國官方操控的媒體，香港當局拒絕確認這些拘捕令的存在。此外，香港警方在2021年12月宣稱，已對至少7名身處海外的民主社運人士及前當選議員發出拘捕令，理由是他們曾在社交媒體發貼文，鼓勵香港居民在當月舉行的立法會選舉中，進行杯葛或投白票。

對新聞自由的衝擊

基本法下保障新聞自由，同時亦得到中英聯合聲明所保證，惟中國及香港當局不斷打擊該項自由，方法是通過針對獨立媒體，從而對在港的本地獨立媒體施以前所未有的壓力。在2021年6月，香港警方國安處搜查獨立報章及網上新聞平台蘋果日報的辦公大樓，拘捕七名該日報及其母公司壹傳媒的行政人員、編輯及寫作人員，並將之控以國安法下的勾結外國或外部分子罪名，同時將屬於該公司的資產凍結。蘋果日報隨後停止所有業務運作。

在2021年12月，國安處的警員拘捕七名與民主派網媒立場新聞相關的人士，懷疑他們觸犯殖民地時代煽動法例下的「串謀刊印或傳播煽動物品」罪行。警方亦搜查該媒體的辦公室、拘捕職員、沒收新聞材料以及凍結其資產。立場新聞隨後宣布停止運作及遣散其員工。在立場新聞遭搜查後，數個其他獨立媒體亦告關閉，同時一些獨立媒體公開稱，從事新聞工作在香港已變得甚為危險。眾新聞在2022年1月停運，並稱關注其職工的安全，正是其中一例。

在該期間，中國及香港官員以至中國官方操控的傳媒，不斷批評香港記者協會，並指責該組織有可能觸犯國安法下的罪行。在2021年7月，該會發出一份名為「破碎的自由」(“Freedom in Tatters”) 的報告，當中描繪新聞自由在香港遭受蠶食的狀況。中國官員亦數度批評在香港的外國記者俱樂部。當中包括在2021年11月期間，抨擊一份該俱樂部發表的會員調查。該調查指出，受訪者相信國安法令香港的傳媒生態轉趨惡化。此外，在2021年12月，該俱樂部發表聲明，表達對立場新聞停運的關注。

在該期間，親北京媒體及政治人物控訴公營廣播機構香港電台，稱其對編輯事務的監督有所不足，同時具反對警方及反政府的傾向，因此違反國安法。特區政府隨後迫令其總裁（時任廣播處長）離職，取而代之的是一名毫無廣播經驗且親北京的公務員。香港電台內的公務員僱員被要求在某限期前進行效忠宣誓，導致多名員工離職。在新的管理層下，基於政治考慮，多名主持人被辭退，節目被取消，以及內容被審查。

香港當局亦威嚇外媒，稱其評論的內容可能會引起法律後果。在華爾街日報出版一篇批評立法會選舉的評論後，一名香港官員向該報發信，謂「我們將保留採取必要行動的權利」以針對任何煽動放棄投票或投廢票的行為。香港當局亦對其他國際媒體的報道及評論發出批評，他們包括經濟學人、El Pais、La Libre 及星期日泰晤士報。

香港當局在該期間，曾拘捕及起訴本地記者，原因為運用公開的官方數據庫以調查發生於2019年的抗議事件。此外，香港當局採取措施，限制公眾使用多個政府的公共數據庫，尤其是香港的公司註冊。所用的方法包括要求公司註冊的使用者披露其名字及身份証號碼，以及把名冊中的公司董事及其住址資料加以限制，當中新聞工作者並不能獲得豁免。

正如過往的報告所述，國務院並沒有資料顯示香港中間人、個人或實體牽涉某些書商或新聞工作者所遭受的域外監視、綁架、拘留或強迫招認。

[May35]

對互聯網自由的影響

一般而言，香港當局並沒有干擾互聯網的公開使用，惟許多報道指出，香港警方通過行使國安法所賦予的權力，要求互聯網供應商對某些網站加以封鎖，當中包括那些與民主運動及1989年天安門屠殺事件相關的網站。香港當局拒絕證實該等報道。在2021年6月，一個以以色列為基地的網頁公司將一個有關香港民主運動的網站移除，事緣是香港警方向該公司發信，聲稱該網站載有「很可能構成危害國家安全罪行」的信息。該公司其後將以上網站復原。

一些社運人士聲稱，當局監視其電郵及互聯網的使用。一些上載至Facebook，Telegram 及 LIHKG.com（「連登」 ── 一個本地網上討論區網站）的信息引致相關人士在國安法及公安條例下被拘捕，亦引起一些人士及組織的關注及自我審查。在涉嫌違反國安法罪行的調查中，當有關內容被視為危害國家安全，警方國安處有權要求刊登資料者或有關的服務供應商移除該等內容，又或者向當局提供協助。在國安法實施後，主要的國際社交媒體公司宣布，它們將不會在依循香港警方索取使用者資料或移除內容的要求。

Facebook、WhatsApp及Twitter均稱，曾在該期間拒絕當局索取使用者資料或移除內容的要求。Google則稱在該期間，曾三次應香港當局的要求而提供資料，一次是基於人身安全受到實質威脅的事件，而另外兩次則與涉嫌販賣人口有關。

在2021年10月，香港通過一項個人資料（私隱）（修訂 ）條例2021 ，將定義廣闊的起底行為刑事化。觀察者憂慮條例會涵蓋任何人士，包括在網上或在電子通訊中曾批評官員的記者。該條例亦強化香港的相關法律基礎，促使科技公司必須依循索取使用者資料及內容移除的要求，否則或會面臨刑事控罪。

對集會自由的影響

在香港法律下，集會自由得到保障，惟香港當局在該期間侵害該權利，尤其針對與民主運動相關人士。根據香港法律，公眾集會及示威的組織者須向警方申請「不反對通知書」。可是在該期間，警方未曾向與中國或香港政府無關聯的團體發出該等通知書，變相禁絕所有抗議活動。當局同時以COVID-19相關限制為由，拒絕發出集會許可。公民權益組織稱該等決定實際上乃為防範舉行政治集會而非保障公共衛生。在2021年6月，警方基於COVID-19的社交距離防疫考慮，連續兩年拒絶對悼念1989年天安門屠殺事件犧牲者的集會發出許可。

在該期間，香港當局拘捕及檢控社運人士以及反對派政治人物，理由是他們涉及未經批准的和平示威。例如在2021年4月，香港某法庭將資深民主社運人士定罪，當中包括李柱銘、吳靄儀、黎智英及李卓人，其罪名為在2019年8月的某和平抗議中進行未經批准集會。在該期間，當局亦拘捕33人並起訴當中30人，因其涉及在2020或2021年進行天安門屠殺事件的紀念活動。在2021年9月，七名民主社運人士因牽涉一項在2019年反政府抗議高峰期的「未經批准集會」，被判處最高16個月的監禁刑期。胡雅文法官對區域法院稱，儘管「集會、遊行及示威的自由」得到香港的小憲法保障，惟該等權利「並非絕對」。

對結社自由的影響

中國及香港當局對於基本法及國際公民及權利公約中所保障的結社自由，不予尊重。中國及香港當局不斷透過威嚇、調查、拘捕、資產凍結乃至其他行動，將它們認為因涉及民主運動而構成「國家安全」問題的團體，強行關閉。據媒體報道，超過40個公民社會組織、工會及政黨在該期間解散；多個團體稱自國安法實施後，它們所面對的法律風險正不斷在上升中。

在2021年8月，香港教育專業人員協會，亦即擁有約95,000名會員的香港規模最大專業工會，決定進行解散。而在這決定前，中國官方操控的媒體形容該協會為必須剷除的「毒瘤」。同時香港當局亦宣稱，決定停止與該會的工作關係，以及調查其潛在的違法事宜。中國官方操控的媒體亦對其作出與外國勾結的指控，指稱該會與環球教師聯盟有聯繫。在2021年10月，職工盟 ── 一個有超過80個工會成員合共逾10萬名會員組成的聯盟 ── 亦告解散。在此之前，中國官方操控的傳媒基於職工盟與國際工會聯盟的聯繫，指控它為「外國代理人」並違反國安法。

在2021年9月，香港警方以違反國安法為由，起訴香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會，即組織紀念1989年天安門屠殺事件年度燭光集會的團體，以及其七名領袖，同時亦指控該組織為「外國代理人」。香港當局其後將該會的資產凍結，並指令將它從香港的公司註冊中除名。

其他在該期間解散的團體包括以往每年均組織大型和平民主抗議的民間人權陣線、為2019年民主抗議中受傷或被捕者提供緊急財務及法律支援的612人道基金，以及中國人權律師關注組，後者為中國大陸的維權律師及人權辯護人提供支援。這些團體均曾遭香港或中國當局或中國官方操控的傳媒公開指控從事違法行為。

在2021年10月，國際特赦組織宣布，將於2021年底前關閉其在香港的本地及地區辦事處。

該組織宣稱，國安法「變相令人權組織無法在港自由運作，同時亦無法免受政府嚴厲報復的恐懼。」

對出入境自由的影響

香港法例對出入境行動自由提供保障，這包括境內行動、外遊、移民以及自願返港，惟在該期間，政府對某些人享受此等權利的自由，施加限制。香港執法當局持續運用一項國安法下的條例，針對因國安法被捕的民主社運人士及反對派政治人物，在未經起訴下沒收其旅遊證件。香港檢控人員亦要求法庭，對保釋中的社運人士、抗議者及政客的旅遊證件予以沒收，又或者對其施以出入境禁令。上述人士正面對國安法及其他法例下，與其政治活動或表述有關的控罪，而該等活動包括參與和平的反政府抗議。

在2021年6月蘋果日報關閉後，香港當局在香港國際機場拘捕一名資深編輯。該名編輯此前並未被起訴，而可靠的媒體報道指出，香港當局持有一份被禁出境人士的觀察名單 ── 在名單中的香港居民一旦試圖離港將會被堵截。此外，香港當局亦通過修訂一項出入境條例。這項於2021年8月生效的修訂引起了法律界、非政府組織及難民支援者的關注，他們認為該修訂賦權予香港當局，可以在欠缺法庭命令的情況下，禁止任何人進入或離開香港。

對教育及學術自由的影響

在該期間，香港當局在中國的指示下，接連採取措施以收緊學校及大學的政治表述，同時對表達異見的教師及學者作出威嚇或懲罰。國安法要求香港當局在學校及大學裏宣揚「國家安全教育」。在該期間，香港教育局依據在2021年2月所發出的指引，於所有政府資助的學校裏，推行各級別的國家安全課程。該課程在國際及私立學校中亦有施行，惟推行規模略小。此外教育局亦指示學校防範及壓制任何有違國安法、基本法或其他香港法例的課程及活動。在上述的指示下，學校務必限制校園内的政治表述及活動，以及就其實施「國安教育」的狀況定期向當局提交報告。

在2021年10月，教育局發出指引，要求所有政府資助的學校每周舉行升旗儀式。

香港及中國官員以至中國官方操控的傳媒皆不斷指控香港的教師未有為學生進行「愛國教育」，並稱這正是2019年民主運動的根源。中國官方操控的媒體指控教協將帶毒的思想散播到學校，並且在該團體宣布解散決定後， 仍然敦促香港的執法部門調查該工會。此外，某些報道稱，由於政治意見或表述，有大學教授被拒獲取長期聘用、升遷或續約。

在2021年7月，在香港大學學生會評議會通過一項動議，悼念一位在香港七一回歸紀念日襲擊一名警員後死亡的人士後，警方對學生會位於香港大學的辦公室進行搜查。學生會後來作出道歉及收回該動議。隨後在香港當局的壓力下，大學管理層禁止曾出席該評議會會議的學生踏足校園，並且與學生會斷絕關係。在2021年8月，警方將四名學生會成員拘捕，原因是懷疑他們在國安法實施下「宣揚恐怖主義」。

對宗教或信仰自由的影響

一般而言，香港當局尊重宗教或信仰自由。在該期間，大多數宗教領袖及支持者均稱國安法並未對其信徒在遵從宗教常規及免受官方干預下進行崇拜構成負面影響。可是，就自我審查及中國對與活躍於2019年民主運動的宗教團體有聯繫的公民社會組織或個人進行潛在打擊，不同團體持續表達憂慮。有報道稱，數名曾經批評國安法或支持民主運動的宗教領袖，由於懼怕受到香港當局報復，經已移居海外。在該期間，當局削減法輪功學員的活動，包括以涉嫌違反COVID-19防疫規則為由，禁止他們設置街站。在2021年7月，數名立法會議員敦促香港政府引用國安法取締法輪功組織。

失實資訊/具政治影響的活動

無論是直接或間接隸屬中國政府的傳媒組織，均積極地在香港從事失實資訊的活動。

該等活動的重心，在於把「外國力量」描繪成香港動亂的煽動者，以及把人們的焦點移離港人的訴求及對中國及香港政府的批評。此外，駐中國大陸的人員採取包括起底及惡意網上行動的威迫手段，藉以威嚇港人及令網上民主聲音絕跡。在2021年9月，維基媒體基金會史無前例地宣布對7名Wikipedia使用者下禁令，同時剝奪另外12名用家的管理員權利。在該宣布前，媒體報道稱，一群駐中國大陸的編輯一直在刪除香港居民所撰寫的內容，並從親北京的角度將有關香港的文章改寫。不僅如此，他們還威嚇要把香港的民主派編輯人員起底。在2021年11月，谷歌的威嚇分析小組刊登證據，顯示一位「很可能獲國家支持」的人士運用一種名為「網絡水坑法」，以此針對某香港傳媒以及一個知名的民主勞工及政治團體。

對港美交流的影響

美國機構恆常與香港的相應單位進行廣泛的學術、文化、教育及科技交流；可是COVID-19的疫情中斷了大部份在香港校舍進行的國際課程及所有由ECA資助的港美交流計劃。「香港正常化」第13936號行政令亦導致香港的富布賴特計劃於2020年7月終止。

對美國公民的影響

在2021年，估計約有八萬五千名美國公民在港居住，惟鑒於當局對COVID-19的抗疫政策，再加上其他因素，促使當中許多選擇短暫或者永久離港，令該數字下跌，目前約為七萬人。

在2021年，基於COVID-19的旅遊限制，非香港居民一般不得訪港，當中例外者只佔極少數。自2020年6月國安法實施以來，中國不斷增強在港的警權和保安權力，令曾公開批評中國的美國公民遭拘捕、拘禁、遞解出境或檢控的風險增加。在2021年1月，香港警方引用國安法拘捕一名美國公民。

[May35]

港美合作與協議

港美持續維持數項例如有關稅務、包裹快遞以及空運服務的雙邊協議。

在該期間，鑒於香港當局在2020年發出通知，聲言擬暫停一項刑事法律互助的協議，美國政府於是透過聯合國打擊有組織跨國罪行公約及聯合國反貪污公約，提出法律互助的官方請求，但成果有限。美國執法當局與香港警方國安處並無進行協作，但美方執法部門持續與其他香港執法相應單位合作，共同打擊人口販賣、貿易詐騙、野生動物販賣、兒童剝削、毒品販賣、知識產權盜竊、金融罪行、清洗黑錢及國際恐怖活動。

制裁協作

在制裁實施的事宜上，美方通過措施及知會方式，定期與香港當局保持聯絡。該等事宜涵蓋美國財政部針對的幾家在港註冊實體所採取的行動，而此等在港註冊實體隸屬與中國及反恐相關的制裁機關。

美國政府所採取的行動

在該期間，美國政府在第13936號行政令下，由於7名中方官員牽涉危害香港和平、安全、穩定及自治的行動及政策，因而對其予以財政制裁。在該行政令的第七節下，遭制裁的特定官員及其家屬亦受簽證限制。在2021年3月及12月，美國國務院按香港自治法案提交報告，並依據該法案的定義準則，確認29名官員亦須受到第13936號行政令所制裁；這可歸因於他們實質上導致中國並沒履行在中英聯合聲明和基本法下所作的承諾。在2021年7月，美國國務院聯同財政部、商務部及國土安全部，基於商企在港業務及活動出現風險，發出了一項商務警示；這包括因國安法的實施及其他立法轉變繼而出現的風險。在2021年8月，拜登總統因應香港的權利及自由遭到大幅削弱後作出回應，他指示允許某些身處美國的港人延遲遣返。在該期間的不同時間，美國政府發出聲明，以回應中國及香港當局的行動，而該等聲明經常是聯同理念相近的盟友共同發出，從而引起關注，以及呼籲有關當局就對港人所承諾的高度自治予以尊重。

僅餘的自治範疇

在2022年3月5日，中國總理李克強聲言，北京當局擬「對兩個特別行政區行使全面管治權」，所指的是香港及澳門。李克強的言論亦與中國中央政府的工作報告相互呼應。該報告首度提及確保由北京當局管治香港以及只許「愛國者」在港擔任要職的政策。儘管香港的經濟及金融制度在多方面有別於中國，惟該等差異經已收窄。同時過往只限出現在中國大陸的商業及法治風險，今天日益成為香港的關注點。中港差異的收窄，在政治範疇中尤為顯著。在該期間，公民社會的活動空間亦見萎縮。

在實施商業協議上，香港繼續享有自主權，同時香港亦奉行自由公開貿易，當中關稅乃至關稅以外的壁壘甚少。香港的法律制度依然建基於普通法系傳統。可是國安法的實施以及來自中國的壓力，無疑令人對司法體制的持續獨立性產生深切關注。不論是在法律上還是實際上，財產權在香港受到良好的保障。香港亦維持採用與美元掛鈎的自身貨幣。在訂定貨幣政策的事宜上，香港金管局獨立於中國人民銀行。

香港可訂定自身的資料條例，亦沒有任何適用廣泛的資料本地化要求。在中國內地的跨境資料傳輸要求下，香港被視為中國境外並且得到如同外國管轄區的待遇。

中國網絡管理局所出版的網絡資料保安條例草稿訂明，凡掌控超過1,000,000人個人資料的中國公司，在尋求於外國交易所公開上市前，必須通過一項中國網絡管理局的網絡審查。根據條例草稿，該要求似乎不適用於尋求來港上市的計劃，惟它載有與上市行動相關的國家安全關注的含糊論述。

在2021年8月，雖然傳媒多番揣測，中國人大會議並沒有投票將中國反外國制裁法在香港實施。該法例可令在港的公司基於滿足外國制裁的要求而遭刑事及民事懲處。

上述的反外國制裁法例應否在港適用的討論亦引起了其他問題，包括香港的法律及監管環境應在何等程度上與內地體制融合。此等融合將大幅危害香港的投資環境，並且大幅提高在該司法管轄區營運的政治及法律風險。

在氣候及綠色經濟的事宜上，香港似乎仍享有高度自由。香港制定了自身在2050年達致碳中和的目標，亦致力在2035年前停用煤炭作為例行發電之用。以上兩者皆遠超中國大陸所訂定的氣候目標，同時香港當局亦已發佈詳細計劃以求達致上述目標。在綠色經濟方面，香港訂定了較中國大陸更嚴格並與國際慣例看齊的氣候披露要求。

在一些國際及多邊組織中，香港可繼續享有獨立於中國大陸的投票權；該等組織包括金融行動特別工作組、亞太經合論壇、國際奧委會以及世界貿易組織。此外，香港亦自主參與各個國際綠色經濟組織。然而就中國對香港投票取向和行動的影響程度一事上，外界並不清楚。有報道稱，在某些組織内，港方代表按中國的政治目標行事，包括防止台灣有意義地參與其作為成員之一的世貿組織，以及防止其擔任領導位置。這都顯示香港參與這些組織的自主性或許正受到蠶食。

出口管制

從2020年12月23日，商務部的工業局對涉港的貿易進行審查，採用等同其他中國目的地的出口管制政策。在2020年12月，工業局制定及發出「軍事用家名單」。三間香港公司被列入「軍事用家名單」，原因是得悉他們對外國軍方提供支援，而為解放軍提供支援的香港飛行服務隊正是其中一間。因此，某些出口、轉口及國內轉移的貿易在以下情況必須取得工業局牌照 ── 即當其中某方獲悉交易的其中一方（例如作為買方、中途付貨人或用家）為軍事用家。

香港政策法的相關現狀

在2020年7月，時任總統特朗普發出第13936號行政令，暫停香港政策法第201(a)節對某些美國法例的適用性。目前第13936號行政令仍然生效。在該期間，在該法202（d）節下未有任何終止事項，而在201(b)節下亦未有任何決議。

[May35]

2021香港政策法案
https://hk.usconsulate.gov/zhhk/n-2021033101-zh/

為遵照美國-香港政策法案1992 (“法案”) (22 U.S.C. 5725 及 5731) 以及國務院、外交行動及相關計劃撥款法案 (Div. K, P.L. 116-260) 的7043(f)(3)©段的要求，美國國務院就香港自二零二零年六月至二零二一年二月(“該期間”)的狀況提交本報告及隨附的證明。

撮要： 按美國國務院的評估，中華人民共和國中央政府在該期間所採取的新舉措直接對美國在港利益構成危害，同時不符合《基本法》及在《中英聯合聲明》下中國承諾給予香港享有高度自治的責任。在核證美國法律下給予香港的待遇上，國務卿核實，按照美國法律，香港不應獲得如同它在一九九七年七月一號前按美國法律所得到的待遇。

中國通過單方面將《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》强加於香港，大幅度稍弱香港居民的權利和自由，當中包括在《基本法》及《中英聯合聲明》所保障的自由。由二零二零年六月國家安全法實施後直至該期間完結為止，香港警察以涉嫌觸犯國安法爲由，共拘捕最少九十九名反對派政治人物，社運人士及示威者，罪行包括分裂國家、顛覆國家、從事恐怖主義活動以及勾結外國或外部勢力。被捕人士包括五十五位因組織或參與在二零二零年七月舉行之泛民主派初選，他們於一月遭拘捕，當中四十七位在二月二十八日被正式控以顛覆國家罪。此外，香港政府透過實施新冠肺炎相關的防疫限制，藉以拒絕向發出公衆示威許可及將立法會的選舉押後至少一年。

國家安全法： 在二零二零年六月，中國人大常委會單方面將國家安全法强行於香港實施，此重大的結構性改變顯著地稍弱香港的自治權。國安法編造出四類罪行：分裂國家、顛覆國家政權、恐怖活動及勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全，當中包括「煽動仇視」中國或香港政府。國安法亦賦予人大常委會而非香港法庭解釋該法的權力。此外，根據國安法成立的維護國家安全公署，其工作人員均由中國國安部門派員出任，同時不受香港政府管轄。除此以外，該公署而並非香港法庭有權行使其權力，就某些涉及國安法的案件行使管轄權。國安法亦成立新的維護國家安全委員會，由特首領導並向中央政府負責。

對香港法治的衝擊： 國安法加强了中國對港府在政策及保安範疇上的控制。它要求港府在其警隊及律政司内成立獨立的國家安全單位。國安法亦要求特首在委任香港警隊的國安署和律政司國安檢控科的首長前，先諮詢維護國家安全公署的意見。國安法授權當局安插中國國安人員於警隊國安部及公署内。香港保安局長李家超在一份於二零二零年六月發出的聲明中指出，中方國安人員將會「按需要」在港進行活動。在該期間，有關公署所從事的活動或對香港居民人權的侵犯，可作爲佐證的資料甚爲有限。有報道指出，中方國安機關對前往中國大陸的香港社運人士進行羈留、問話及恫嚇。

香港當局據報要求金融機構凍結前立法會議員、公民社會團體及其他疑似遭受調查其民主活動的政治目標人物的銀行戶口。有社運人士報稱警方對非暴力示威者施以肢體攻擊。警隊的投訴警察課(CAPO)及獨立監察警方處理投訴委員會(IPCC)獲賦予職權監察警隊，亦負責調查警隊内部涉嫌貪污或濫權的事件。惟投訴警察課均為警隊人員，因此制度上欠缺獨立性。同時，督導投訴警察課的獨立監察警方處理投訴委員會則沒有所需要的權力以進行有效的調查。在二零二零年十一月的一個案例中，香港法院指出現行處理投訴警察的機制「並不完善」。

拘捕、保釋及調查程序： 在該期間，警方引用國安法拘捕九十九人，當中包括一名美籍公民。除一宗案件外，所有在國安法下作出的拘捕均基於非暴力行爲。根據香港警方的公開聲明，律政司引用國安法控告五十六名人士。至今並未有國安法案件進入審訊程序。國安法的適用範圍，並不局限於香港或其居民，它同時適用於在香港以外所觸犯的有關罪行。根據一篇本地媒體的報道，港警在國安法下對約三十名居於外地的人士發出拘捕令。（註：這些拘捕令並非公開，亦未經任何官員確認。）此外，港警國安署據報亦曾進行與國安法無關的拘捕。

民主派人士當中，包括北京批評者、傳媒大亨黎智英，面對被拒保釋者越來越多。在國安法下保釋標準較高，而政府檢控官稱「無罪假定」的原則並不適用於與國安法相關的保釋聆訊。在國安法下，除非法官有足夠理由相信疑犯將不會繼續從事危害國家安全活動，否則不會批出保釋。香港警方有權強加保釋條件於那些已獲釋且沒被起訴的人士，同時保釋限制一直生效，直至調查完結。社運人士稱該保釋制度令有關人士處於不確定狀態，也就是在並未被正式檢控下卻必須每月向警察報到，而該狀態並沒有明確的時限, 或規定當局必須於某日期前決定提控。同時，警方對正被調查涉及國安法罪行的人士，沒收其旅遊證件及其他財物，防止他們在警方保釋下離港。

國安法賦予港警廣泛權力，在未獲授權下，可進行在國安法相關案件中的竊聽或電子監視。國安法亦容許警方在未獲授權下進行搜查，當中包括電子儀器。警方亦可要求互聯網服務供應商提供或刪除有關案件的資料。有可靠的報告指出，中國國安機關及維護國家安全公署對香港的民主及人權社運人士及新聞界人士進行監視。

對香港民主制度的衝擊： 在中國的監督下，香港政府運用國安法窒礙民主聲音及鎮壓反對派的政治活動。自二零二零年六月起，警隊成員及香港律政司聯同中國官員及在其監督下，對反對派政客及社運人士進行政治清算。

國安法要求所有香港居民，無論參與選舉或擔任公職，均必須宣誓擁護基本法和效忠香港。在二零二零年十二月，港府官員開始要求所有香港公務員進行以上宣誓。一名高級政府官員宣佈，倘若公務員拒絕宣誓，他們可能會失去其工作；已宣誓者若日後所作的行爲和言論被認爲違反誓言亦可能要面對刑事控罪。

邁向普選的進展及對立法會的衝擊： 由於香港選民在特首的選舉中，並不享有選舉的權利，因此該職位並不向香港市民問責。香港市民只有在立法會七十席中，能以直選方式選出四十席；而在有選舉權限制的功能組別中選出餘下的三十席。在區議會選舉中，香港市民享有普選權利。《基本法》第四十五條規定，香港特別行政區的行政長官的選舉「最終達至由一個有廣泛代表性的提名委員會按民主程序提名後普選產生的目標」。特區行政長官由一個約1,200人 (最近一次在2017年的選舉中有1,194名委員) 的行政長官選舉委員會選舉產生。選委會中包含七十名立法會議員以及專業，商貿界別的精英。基本法亦指出立法會「最終目標」將會是「所有立法會議員都會由普選產生」。

在該匯報期間，香港政府及中國採取多次行動，限制港人選出其代表的權利。自二零一六年起，選舉事務處要求所有立法會候選人簽署確認書，聲明香港乃中國「不可分割」的一部分。在二零二零年七月該選舉事務處取消一共十二名立法會候選人的資格，他們當時正參選現已遭押後的二零二零年九月立法會選舉，當中包括四名時任立法會議員，而原因是指他們的言論與其確認承諾不相符。

在二零二零年七月，特首林鄭月娥，在中國的支持下，將二零二零年九月的立法會選舉押後最少一年。林指出其決定是基於新冠肺炎疫情的考慮，縱使香港的發病率遠較其他一些在疫情下安全進行選舉的國家及城市爲低。反對派政治人物以及民主倡導者認爲港府的真正目的乃是避免建制派在選舉中落敗。反對派及泛民候選人在最近一次二零一九年十一月區議會選舉中贏得超過百份之七十的議席。截至撰寫報告時，港府仍未宣佈新選舉的日期。

中國在另一次前所未有的行動中，取消了在任的立法會議員的資格。在二零二零年十一月，全國人大常委會作出決定，指任何公職或當選官員若被發現從事「危害國家安全”的行爲將會即時喪失擔任其職位的資格」。該決定適用於四位較早前被港府取消再參選資格的在任議員。港府隨後宣佈該四位議員被即時取消擔任餘下立法會任期的議員資格，同時該資格取消的決定並不容許司法覆核。關鍵的是，缺少四個泛民席位令親北京陣營在立法會中佔有絕大多數，因而剝奪泛民在立法會中最後的有效制衡權。其後，餘下的十五位泛民議員集體請辭，而港府則拒絕為議席空缺進行補選。截至一月二十七日，這些及較早的請辭與資格取消的結果導致在立法會七十個議席中，有二十七個懸空，當中包括四十個直選議席當中的二十席。

香港政府對反對派組織的初選活動進行打壓。警方在一月採取行動，從二零二零年七月由公民社會人士組織的非官方初選中，拘捕五十二名候選人（他們全部身處香港）當中的四十九位。泛民反對派通過初選選出候選人參與已遭押後的二零二零年九月立法會選舉。警方同時拘捕六名初選的組織者，包括一名美籍人士。港方及中方官員聲稱該初選所訂定的目標（及該目標的討論）構成在國安法下的顛覆國家罪，原因是初選組織者指出他們的目標就是在立法會内令泛民主派取得大多數席位，從而拒絕通過港府提出的財政預算案及迫使特首辭職。然而這些行動全都是基本法所容許的。

對司法機構的衝擊： 雖然香港法院繼續行使對香港法律的司法覆核權，但國安法訂明解釋國安法的權力在於人大常委會，而不是香港法院。人大常委會的決定 – 包括取消四名在任立法會議員的資格 – 在香港具有法律效力，同時亦不會受到香港法院的司法覆核。國安法授權沒有司法獨立且定罪率達百分之九十九的中國司法體系，在港府或維護國家安全公署的要求下，接手處理任何與國家安全相關的案件。在國安法下，香港特首需要指定一張法官清單，以處理所有與國家安全相關罪行的案件。縱使香港法院可從指定名單中挑選法官處理個別案件，分析家指出這史無前例讓特首介入的做法削弱了香港的司法獨立。維護國家安全公署的活動不受香港的法律管轄，同時維護國家安委員會的決定在國安法下不受司法覆核。

雖然港府在期間内，一般情況下尊重司法獨立及公正，中國卻作出行動損害香港司法的獨立性。由中方所控制在港或内地的國家媒體不斷指控香港法官作出判決時有所偏頗，對被控騷亂或其他罪行的示威者予以釋放。在二零二零年十一月，一位負責香港政策的中方高級官員呼籲「司法改革」，從司法機構中去除「外來價值」。此外，一些香港和中方官員質疑「三權分立」在香港是否存在，包括發表香港法律並不昭示司法獨立，及法官應遵從政府的「指引」的言論。

對集會自由的衝擊： 香港法律保障集會自由，可是在該期間香港政府並不尊重這權利。在香港法律下，公衆集會和示威的組織者須向警方申請所需的「不反對通知書」，可是在匯報期間警方並沒有發出任何不反對通知書，亦即是禁止所有抗議活動。當局引用新冠肺炎疫情的限制爲由，拒絕批准舉行集會活動，而公民權益團體認爲當局的目的是為防止政治集會而並非加强公共衛生。在二零二零年六月，警方亦以保持社交距離的考慮爲由，首次拒絕批准舉行悼念一九八九年天安門屠殺事件中死難者的年度燭光晚會。

在匯報期間，香港當局拘捕及檢控社運人士及反對派政治人物，涉嫌組織及參與未經批准的非暴力示威。例如在二零二零年十二月，香港法院判處社運人士黃之鋒、林朗彦及周庭七至十三個半月的刑期，正因他們涉及於二零一九年六月在警察總部的非暴力抗議。據媒體報道，截至二零二零年九月，警方以反政府抗議相關的控罪共拘捕超過一萬人，當中大多數被捕者在保釋下獲得釋放。檢控官亦對逾2,200位抗議者作出檢控。

對言論與結社自由的衝擊：香港法律保障言論自由，但香港政府不時採取與言論自由相違背的行動。在二零二零年七月，當局以違反國安法為由拘捕手持印有批評政府口號的貼紙和標誌的示威者。在二零二零年九月，港府引用在九七回歸中國主權以來從未使用過的《煽動暴亂條例》，藉以控告一名高喊反政府口號的社運人士。這引起香港社運人士和法律學者的關注，認爲該煽動暴亂條例與香港人權法案所列出的權利和自由並不相符。在二零二零年十月，港府指一名青年社運人士在社交媒體上刊登的内容涉嫌干犯分裂國家罪以及合謀刊印煽動暴亂内容罪, 予以控告。

該社運人士亦於二零二零年十二月在另一宗「侮辱中國國旗」的案件中被判處四個月監禁。在國安法下，批評中央或本地政府或其政策的言論有可能被理解爲支持分裂國家、顛覆國家又或挑起對政府的仇恨。在二零二零年六月，香港通過法例，把侮辱或不尊重中國國歌列爲罪行，刑期最高為三年監禁。數個民主派政黨及社運團體，包括學生組織，由於恐怕在新的法律體系下其結社自由不再受到保障，在六月國安法頒佈後自行解散。再者，國安法也新增「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」的罪行，從而引起進一步的憂慮。

對新聞自由的衝擊：基本法及中英聯合聲明同時保障香港的新聞自由，惟警方和保安機關的行動卻不斷令新聞自由受到威脅。本地以至在港有業務的國際媒體均見活躍，積極表達廣泛意見。但是，可靠的報道指出，香港警方及中國國安隊伍騷擾、恫嚇及拘捕一些記者和媒體機構員工。此外，持續有報告指出，由於害怕遭官方秋後算賬，媒體正進行自我審查。在二月，香港電台，即香港的主要官方廣播機構，緊隨北京的步伐，在港停播英國廣播公司世界新聞。

香港記者協會在二零二零年六月所進行的一項調查發現，絕大部分在港記者對人身安全表示擔憂。報導指出，有外國記者的簽證遭到延誤，而當局卻未有解釋，同時亦有外國記者被限制來港。在二零二零年七月，香港政府拒絕延續一位受聘於紐約時報的澳洲籍新聞從業員的居留許可。該公司在當月稍後宣佈，鑒於對國安法的憂慮，將會把其區内數碼業務由香港遷往首爾。

其他在該期間對新聞自由及媒體的影響詳列在二零二零年度香港人權報告中。正如以往的報告指出，美國國務院並未有資料顯示香港的機關、人員或實體涉及對某些書商及新聞從業員進行監視、綁架、扣留或者强迫承認的活動。

不實資訊/具惡意政治影響的活動： 中國直接或間接擁有的傳媒機構在港積極地傳播不實資訊。目的主要是將美國及其他外國描繪成香港騷亂的煽動者，同時將人們的注意力從港人的訴求以至對中國或港府的批評轉移。在二零二零年六月，推特(Twitter)公司宣佈它將兩萬三千個與中共有聯繫的中國賬戶移除，部分理由是由於他們「不斷地發出有關香港政治動態的虛假陳述」。此外，有十五萬個沒有或沒甚追蹤者的「擴音器」賬戶被發現用作把該等虛假訊息的瀏覽人數放大，令人誤認為它們非常受歡迎。

對互聯網自由的衝擊： 一般而言，香港政府不對上網行爲進行干涉，縱使偶有個別報道指出當局曾中斷對某些網站的連結。此外，有社運人士稱當局對其電郵及互聯網進行監控。一些放上Facebook，Telegram及LIHKG(一個本地網站)的訊息曾被引用為國安法及公安條例下的拘捕行動的證據，引起個別人士和組織的憂慮，因而進行自我審查。在國安法實施後，主要的國際社交媒體公司宣佈他們不再因應香港警方的要求而提供用戶的資料。在二零二零年七月，在國安法實施下，四名學生由於其在Facebook的貼文被指涉嫌鼓吹分裂國家而被捕在一月，一個網上平台的組織者聲稱本地互聯網供應商因應港府要求，令其網站不能被香港用戶登入。其後，一互聯網服務供應商證實，為「遵從國安法發出的要求」，已將一個網站屏蔽。

對出入境自由的衝擊： 香港法律保障出入境自由，包括境内行動、外國旅游、移民以及自願返回。但在該期間，港府在一些個案中對這權利進行限制。香港執法當局運用國安法下的條例，在未有提控下, 沒收在該法下遭拘捕的民主社運人士及反對派政治人物的旅遊證件，這包括五十五位在一月被捕的人士。對一些遭控告與國安法無關, 但參與非暴力反政府抗議相關控罪的社運人士、抗議者及政治人物，政府檢控官不時要求法庭沒收其旅遊證件，或者對其實施出境限制。有社運人士在二零二零年八月指出香港警方曾監視十二名遭限制出境，欲以快艇前赴台灣的社運人士，導致他們遭中國海巡部門截獲及拘留。深圳當局讓當中兩名未成年人士在二零二零年十二月回港面對香港當局的檢控，並判處其餘十名社運人士七個月至三年的監禁。

[May35]

對宗教或信念自由的衝擊： 一般而言，香港尊重宗教或信念的自由。但在國安法實施下，有宗教領袖和倡議者表達關注，他們憂慮港府以打擊所謂顛覆爲名，削弱宗教自由和言論自由。在二零二零年十二月，警方凍結一間教會的銀行戶口，同時突擊搜查兩棟教會建築物及拘捕兩名教會理事，指出該教會正被調查與一項衆籌活動相關的清洗黑錢及欺詐行爲。教會牧師否認指控，稱該突擊搜查以及資產凍結乃是針對教會對民主運動抗議者的支持而做出的政治報復。

對美國公民的衝擊： 現時估計約有八萬五千名居港的美國公民，而在二零一九年共有一百一十萬名美國公民到訪或過境香港。在二零二零年，則只有八萬一千名美國公民到訪或過境香港，跌幅可歸因於嚴格的新冠肺炎疫情相關旅遊限制。香港的罪案率一直維持在低水平。自從在二零二零年六月國安法實施以來，中國日益對港加强行使警權以至國安權力，令公開批評中國的美國公民處於較高風險，他們所面對的風險包括被拘捕、拘留、遞解出境，又或者在港或香港境外遭受檢控。在一月，香港警方引用國安法拘捕了一名美國公民。

香港警察在美國公民被捕時，有作出及時知會，同時他們亦提供便利，讓美國領事館官員可探視遭拘留的美國公民。當在機場發生拘捕或拒絕入境事件時，入境官員亦有及時知會領事館及提供探視便利。然而，香港政府不再承認雙重國籍，並嚴格執行在一九九七年後已經實施的現行中國國籍法條款，導致同時持有中國國籍的美國公民，包括持香港護照者，無法得到領事協助。

對學術及交流的衝擊： 國安法要求香港政府在學校及大學校園中推廣「國家安全教育」。在二月，香港教育局發出指引，在所有政府資助學校的所有班級推行「國家安全教育」課程，同時在較低程度上適用於國際學校及私立學校。教育局亦指示學校，務須防止和壓制任何有違國家安全法、基本法或是其他香港法例。

學者及民主倡導者指出，留意到有中學課本因應國安法進行相關改動。在二零二零年八月，一些教科書出版商同意參與由政府發起的通識教科書「自願覆檢計劃」。據媒體報道，該等出版商其後刪除「三權分立」、有關香港抗議的圖片以及對中國政治制度的批評。在二零二零年十一月，特首林鄭月娥公佈對官立中學通識科所進行改動的内容。所有新的學習素材及教科書必需送交教育局進行預先審核，同時通識課程將會縮減，重心將會轉移至教授中國國家發展、中國憲法、香港基本法以及法治概念。

香港官員敦促教師避免表達政治意見。在二零二零年十月，官員吊銷一名小學教師的註冊。該教師涉嫌在課堂討論言論自由時使用有關「香港獨立」的素材，實際上終生禁止其在香港教育界工作。在二零二零年十一月，官員吊銷第二位教師的註冊，因其涉嫌在一歷史課堂中作出「失實教學」。在二零二零年七月，官員宣佈就近二百項涉及老師參與二零一九年抗議運動的投訴展開調查。在二零二零年七月，香港大學不依從其教務委員會的建議，的原因，開除了民主運動人士戴耀廷的終身制法律教授職務，指其組織「佔中運動」而被刑事定罪。

美國機構恆常與香港的相應單位進行學術、文化、教育和科學的交流，然而新冠肺炎的疫情中斷了在香港校園的面授課堂以及所有由美國國務院教育文化局資助的香港交流計劃。此外，根據第13936號行政命令, 美國在二零二零年七月終止了香港傅爾布萊特計劃。

剩餘自治的範疇： 縱然中國的行動侵犯香港的政治自主權，在本報告涵蓋期間，香港與中國大陸之間在經濟、法律以至商業層面上依然存在顯著的差異。正如在該期間之前一樣，香港政府可繼續行使權力，以執行商業協定及奉行自由開放貿易政策，其關稅以及非關稅的貿易壁壘可謂微不足道。縱使國安法的實施以及來自中國的壓力引起人們對香港司法系統能否持續維持其獨立性產生深切憂慮，惟香港的法律制度依然建基於普通法傳統。在香港，產權受到法律以至執行上的保障，同時香港一直維持本身的貨幣，並與美元掛鈎。香港金融管理局能自主制定獨立於中國的金融政策，而香港亦可以獨立於中國大陸的方式參與二十四個國際組織和多邊實體，包括反洗錢金融行動特別工作組、亞太經濟合作組織、國際奧林匹克委員會及世界貿易組織。

港美合作與協定： 美國及香港一直維持多項雙邊協定，範疇涵蓋稅務、包裹派遞及航空服務。但在二零二零年八月，美國基於第13936號行政命令知會港府，暫停一項關於移交逃犯的協議，同時亦終止一項移送已判刑人士的協議及一項有關相互税收豁免的協議。港府其後回應並向美國作出知會，聲稱將會暫停與美方有關刑事司法互助的協議。美國執法機關與香港警方國安部並沒有任何接觸，但美國執法機構繼續與香港各對應執法部門合作，共同打擊人口販運、走私、販毒、知識產權盜竊、金融犯罪、清洗黑錢及恐怖主義活動。

出口管制： 在二零二零年六月，美國商務部的工業及保安局暫停對香港的牌照豁免，當中適用於出口、轉口或轉運往香港或於香港内部轉移，而香港在上述情況以往可獲差別對待。法例的更改令香港在牌照豁免上，與中國所獲得的待遇相同。數項香港過往獲得的牌照豁免因法例的變更而受到影響。在二零二零年十二月，工業及保安局編制及出版「軍事最終用戶名單」。三家香港公司被列入初輪實體清單内，而該等實體涉及向外國軍方提供支援。這三間公司當中主要包括政府飛行服務隊，被列入清單是由於它支持中國解放軍。此外，對於來自美國的出口而言，工業及保安局不再視香港為獨立目的地。由於香港是貿易中心及主要港口城市，因而出現風險，令受到美國管制的物品可以經香港得以非法轉運，故此數間公司涉嫌違規而被列入工業及保安局的實體清單。與此同時，工業及保安局與港方對應部門合作，共同減低有關物品經香港擴散的風險。

制裁的執行： 美國經常與香港政府就制裁執行的問題上進行溝通，提高了跨國及本地的金融服務公司對制裁相關風險的意識，亦在合規層面上有所提升。在港註冊的實體通常是前沿公司(front company)而其擁有人身處海外，而該等實體曾被聯合國專家組就制裁北韓的報告所引證。香港政府一直加强調查或遭聯合國制裁的在港行爲。惟截至目前，港府仍未依據香港法律，對任何港人因涉及有關聯合國對北韓實施制裁的行爲，採取行動或者對他們作出檢控。香港政府只是取消數家涉嫌協助北韓經濟活動的公司的註冊。此外，美國財政部基於對伊朗的制裁措施，對數個牽涉其中的香港實體實施制裁。

美國制裁： 在匯報期間，美國政府按第13936號行政命令對三十五名香港及中國官員分四輪實施財政制裁，該等官員涉及國安法的訂定、採納和執行，以及其他危害香港自治和壓制香港基本自由的行動與政策。在二零二零年十月，美國國務院在香港自治法案下提交了一份報告，識別出十位官員，他們實質上導致中國違反它在中英聯合聲明及基本法下的責任，而該十位官員亦在第13936號行政命令之下遭到制裁。在該行政命令的第七節下，那些遭受財政制裁者乃至其直系家屬亦同時受到簽證限制。

香港政策法案的發現： 在二零二零年七月，時任美國總統特朗普簽發第13936號行政命令， 暫停香港政策法案第201(a)段對某些美國法律的適用性。第13936號行政命令隨附於本報告内。正如以上有關雙邊協定的段落所詳述，縱使在本報告所涵蓋的期間，美國暫停一項雙邊協定及終止另外兩項協定，惟並沒有對香港政策法案第202(d)段作出任何終止行動，又或是對第201(b)段作出任何決議。

2021 Hong Kong Policy Act Report
https://www.state.gov/2021-hong-kong-policy-act-report/